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I.

MR. REESE'S CLAIM THAT LWP DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN A
MEDIATION AND IS THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO THE
PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY WAS NOT PRESERVED
BELOW AND IS THEREFORE WAIVED BY MR. REESE.1
Mr. Reese's argument that LWP Solutions, Inc. ("LWP") did not participate in a

mediation with Mr. Reese and therefore is not entitled to the protections of confidentiality
given to mediation discussions was not raised before the trial court and it is therefore
waived. "As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a
constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Brown,
856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Sweet v. Sweet 138 P.3d 63, 64 fh2 (Utah
App.2006).
Here, Mr. Reese has not alleged plain error or exceptional circumstances, and the
Court should decline to address Mr. Reese's argument that LWP and Mr. Reese were not
participating in a mediation at the time that he alleges an oral agreement was reached
because this issue was not raised below. In fact, the plain language of Mr. Reese's
arguments to the trial court belie his claims. In the affidavit submitted by Mr. Henriksen
in support of his Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, Mr. Henriksen noted that

1

As was the case in Mr. Reese's opposition to LWP Solutions, Inc.'s to Motion for Discretionary Interlocutory
Appeal, Mr. Reese and his counsel utilize derogatory and improper language in its brief, which LWP asks the court
to ignore. For example, Mr. Reese uses language such as "fabricate," "grossly misinterprets," "falsely,"
"exaggerate," "twisted," "conceal," and "misinterpret." Also, the use of the phrase "Welch" as reference to the
alleged failure of LWP to adhere to some imagined agreement is a racially prejudicial statement. The use of the
phrase "to Welch" originated in the early 19th Century when the English government decided that all Welsh children
should speak English in school. Any child caught speaking Welsh had a board place around his/her neck and could
only get rid of it by "telling on" another child who was using Welsh. "Welshing" came to be used to describe a
person who was a "traitor." See http://www.rsdb.org. However, it is clear that it is a racial slur that this Court
should not adopt in any of its published opinions.
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"[alt the mediation conference the parties reached an agreement for the resolution of all
issues in the case, including the subrogation interest of LWP." R69 (emphasis added).
Mr. Henriksen also admitted that Ms. Acosta, as counsel for LWP, was present during the
mediation. R69. In the Motion itself, Mr. Reese admitted that LWP participated in the
mediation. R55-56. Mr. Reese stated "[during the mediation it came to that point and
the Plaintiffs counsel asked LWP to compromise the amount of the lien" so the case
could settle. R56 (emphasis added). Mr. Reese also made representations to the trial
court such as "later in the mediation" and "[t]he mediation, therefore, concluded because
all three parties reached this satisfactory agreement." R57.
In no uncertain terms, Mr. Reese took the position at the trial court level that LWP
participated in the mediation and that any alleged agreement between LWP and Mr.
Reese was reached during such mediation. Mr. Reese cannot now take the contrary
position. He did not preserve at the trial court level his argument that he and LWP were
not participating in a mediation at the time the alleged agreement was reached.
LWP does note that Mr. Reese has revealed the weaknesses of his own position by
attempting to switch defenses on appeal. Rather than seek to distinguish the case law,
rules and statutes proposed by LWP, Mr. Reese seeks to side-step their application. See
Opposition at page 18 (where Mr. Reese argues lhat the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-3 lb-8, B, Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999) and Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute
Resolution do not apply). By his own actions, Mr. Reese acknowledges that he has no
real defense to the fact that all mediation discussions are confidential.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Furthermore, Mr. Reese's own actions at the mediation itself belie his claim that
LWP was not a participant in the mediation. For example, LWP was addiessed by the
mediator during the initial "joint session" of the mediation where the ground rules of the
mediation were set forth by the mediator. LWP was asked to meet with and discuss the
case with the mediator alone, the mediator and the plaintiff, and the mediator and Tingey
Construction. LWP was identified on the proposed Memorandum of Understanding and
was asked by Mr. Reese to execute this document. These facts are conclusive evidence
that LWP was a participant in the mediation (even if it was not a party to the underlying
legal action) and that all participants at the mediation (including Mr. Reese) treated LWP
as a participant.
If new evidence were allowed, LWP would introduce evidence which would show
that LWP participated in the mediation because it believed that it was entitled to the
benefits and limitations of mediation and would not have participated otherwise. Mr.
Reese did not argue to the trial court that LWP was not participating in the mediation and
as a consequence, LWP was deprived of its due process right to introduce evidence to
rebut this claim. It is for precisely this reason that appellate courts refuse to hear issues
raised for the first time on appeal.
In short, Mr. Reese's argument that LWP was not a participant in the mediation
was not preserved in the trial court and is therefore waived. The Court should disregard
all arguments asserted by Mr. Reese which attempt to argue that LWP was not a
participant in the mediation and is not entitled to the benefits of confidentiality.
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II.

MR. REESE MISCHARACTERIZES SEVERAL FACTS IN HIS
RECITATION OF THE FACTS WHICH LWP CAN REBUT.
LWP would first like to point out the difficult position in which it finds itself.

LWP believes in the force and benefit of mediation and believes that the only way in
which mediation will continue to prosper is if confidentiality of the mediation process is
preserved. However, Mr. Reese has made several statements in his Opposition that are
inaccurate, incomplete and misleading. LWP will attempt to rebut and respond to these
statements without breaching the confidentiality of the mediation process. Any statement
by LWP in its response should not be viewed by this Court as a waiver of the
confidentiality of the mediation discussions between LWP and Mr. Reese. That LWP is
in this unusual predicament is further evidence of why alleged oral agreements reached
during mediation should not be allowed. The Uniform Mediation Act which Utah
adopted on May 1, 2006 and the Court-Annexed Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution
all require that agreements reached during mediation be reduced to writing so as to avoid
the exact situation in which LWP finds itself here.
A.

The Trial Court Delayed in Allowing LWP to Intervene, Causing
Procedural Problems.

At page 7 of it Opposition to LWP's brief in support of its appeal, Mr. Reese states
that LWP "addresses [itself] as an intervening party without authority to do so." Mr.
Rees touts this fact as evidence that LWP was being dishonest with the trial court.
What Mr. Reese fails to mention is that when LWP filed a proposed order with the
court it simultaneously filed a motion to intervene. R135. LWP had expected that the
trial court would recognize the procedural problems faced by LWP because it was subject
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the trial court's order but, as a non-party, was not in a position to appeal the ruling.
LWP simultaneously filed the motion to intervene with the expectation that the trial court
would grant the motion to intervene prior to issuing an order binding LWP to produce its
counsel for deposition. R135.

Unfortunately, the trial court made the subsequent

procedural error of executing an order directing LWP to produce its counsel without first
allowing LWP to intervene. R179, 197.
As this Court is aware, LWP was left in a procedural quagmire and was forced to
concurrently file a motion for discretionary interlocutory appeal and a petition for an
extraordinary writ. R195, 196. LWP sought the extraordinary writ because, as a non
party, it did not have standing to appeal the trial court's ruling that it should produce its
counsel for deposition regarding the confidential mediation discussions. R195. Over
Mr. Reese's objections, LWP was allowed to intervene in the suit and then this Court
granted its petition for discretionary interlocutory appeal. R157, 197, 205. Mr. Reese's
comment at page 7 of his opposition that LWP wrongfully identified itself as an
intervening party in its proposed order is, at best, a half truth and obviously does not fully
explain to the Court the procedural history of the suit. LWP intended that the trial court
allow it to intervene prior to executing its proposed order. The trial court did not do this.
Mr. Reese's attempt to point to this fact as evidence of LWP's deceptive tactics fails
miserably.
Next, at page 8, Mr. Reese disparages LWP for waiting until June 29, 2006 (the
day before LWP's counsel was to be deposed) to file its motion to quash the deposition
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notice and to file its motions for discretionary appeal and motion for extraordinary writ.
R185. Again, Mr. Reese deletes important facts that make LWP's behavior reasonable.
Mr. Reese issued a faulty Notice of Deposition on June 22, 2006. (See Motion to
Quash Deposition at page 185 of the record for a discussion of the deficiencies of this
notice). The trial court did not execute an order directing LWP to produce its counsel for
deposition until June 26, 2006. R179. As noted above, this order did not address the
issue of whether LWP would be allowed to intervene in the suit even though it directed
LWP to produce its counsel for deposition. R179. In its Motion to Quash Notice of
Deposition of S. Grace Acosta, LWP informed the trial court (yet again) that it had not
been allowed to intervene in the suit and that procedurally it was being disadvantaged by
the trial court's failure to allow it to intervene.2 Rl85.
The trial court did not allow LWP to intervene in the suit until July 10, 2006, after
LWP had filed its motion for discretionary appeal, after it had filed its petition for
extraordinary relief and after the date for Ms. Acosta's deposition had run. R197. What
Mr. Reese fails to acknowledge is that LWP waited until the day before Ms. Acosta's
deposition to file its motion to quash because it wasn't until that date that LWP knew that
the Court would not rule on its motion to intervene until after the deposition date. Mr.
LWP believed that it could not file an Appellate Rule 5 Petition for Discretionary
Appeal until the trial court allowed it to intervene in the suit. In order to preserve its
arguments for appeal, LWP filed concurrent Rule 8 Motions for Extraordinary Writ and a
Rule 5 Petition for Discretionary Writ. This court denied the Rule 8 Extraordinary Writ
and noted in its ruling that LWP had the ability to protect itself by proceeding with its
already filed Rule 5 Petition for Discretionary Appeal. LWP also filed the Motion to
Quash the Notice of Deposition for Ms. Acosta concurrently with a motion to stay the
proceedings during pendency of appeal. LWP was forced to file both the motion to quash
and the motion to stay to ensure that the deposition of Ms. Acosta did not take place.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Reese's attempt to attribute mal intent or bad faith to LWP's actions is misplaced and
based upon incomplete facts. LWP kept hoping the trial court would rule on its motion to
intervene and when it didn't, LWP had no choice but to file a motion to quash the day
before the deposition.
B. The Mediator did Conduct Negotiations between L WP and Mr. Reese.
At page 11 of his opposition, Mr. Reese states, "Mr. Felt, the mediator, was not
involved in mediating the agreement which was made between Craig Reese and LWP."
This is not true. LWP met with Mr. Reese and the mediator jointly at times, spoke with
the mediator privately and spoke with the defendants and the mediator in joint sessions as
well. Mr. Felt was actively trying to get LWP to alter its position so as to facilitate a
settlement. Mr. Reese is yet again mistaken on this fact. Also noteworthy is that LWP
was included in the Memorandum of Understanding from the mediator. If LWP was not
a party to the mediation, it would not have been included in the Memorandum of
Understanding drafted by the mediator.
C. L WP did not Change its Mind Because No Agreement was Ever Reached.
Mr. Reese also misstates the facts when he claims that LWP "changed its mind"
about an agreement. Without waiving any confidentiality about the mediation
discussions, Mr. Reese is mistaken in his belief that LWP agreed to waive the
requirement that he exhaust funds from other sources prior to LWP resuming its
obligation to continue making medical payments to Mr. Reese. This term was never
discussed between the parties. R126-131.

\

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

After lengthy discussion between Mr. Reese, the mediator and Tingey (in which
LWP did not participate), Mr. Reese's counsel exited an office and told Ms. Acosta that
an agreement had been reached between Mr. Reese and the defendant, Tingey
Construction. R129. Ms. Acosta called her client to discuss the settlement and its role in
the settlement. R129. While reviewing the terms with LWP, Ms. Acosta realized that
LWP and Mr. Reese had not discussed a central term. R129-30. Ms. Acosta
immediately notified Mr. Reese's counsel of this fact and then refused to execute the
Memorandum of Understanding because it contained the term to which LWP did not
agree. R129-131. A contract was not formed between LWP and Mr. Reese because an
essential term was not discussed and agreed to.
D. L WP has Always Asserted that No Agreement was Reached.
Despite Mr. Reese's claim to the contrary, LWP has always maintained that the
parties never discussed whether Mr. Reese would be required to exhaust funds from the
settlement before LWP's obligation to continue medical treatment would resume. R125131. Mr. Reese argues in his brief at page 13 that he did not know until the hearing on
May 22, 2006 that LWP asserted that no agreement was reached between the parties and
that he was shocked by this revelation. R213, 39:23-25; 40:18-20.

This is obviously

not true.
In support of its opposition to Mr. Reese's motion to enforce settlement, LWP
submitted copies of two letters between counsel. R91-93. In the letter found at R91,
LWP informed Mr. Reese as follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thus, it is our position that neither a memorandum of
understanding nor a firm agreement had been reached. It is
also our position that settlement negotiating in mediation are
not complete and finalized until all parties agree to the final
version of the written proposal. It is for this very reason that I
always contact or meet with my client near the end of
mediations to confirm that this is the agreement they intended
to make. I do not sign any mediation summary until it is read
to my client (or if my client is present, read together). Until
that point, or until there is a memorandum of understanding,
the agreement is tentative.
R92.
On February 1, 2006, LWP again wrote Mr. Reese. In that letter, LWP stated as
follows:
As I have told you before, it is my position and the position of
my client, that no agreement was reached during the
mediation and that we were still in negotiations when the
mediation concluded.
Again, no writing was executed in this case and it was only
when the terms were being reduced to writing that I contacted
my client for final approval and did not get such approval.
R93-94.
Additionally, LWP attached an affidavit of its counsel to the Opposition to the Motion to
Enforce Settlement Agreement. R88. In that affidavit, Ms. Acosta stated as follows:
Prior to leaving the mediation on December 30, 2005, I
made it clear to all involved that LWP did not agree to the
terms of the settlement set forth in the document drafted by
the mediator, Paul Felt.
I refused to execute the written agreement because it
contained a term to which LWP did not agree. I told Mr.
Henriksen this as soon as it became clear to me that the term
included in the document had not been agreed to by my
client.
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R88. Thus, LWP has always maintained that no agreement was reached during the
mediation and that the agreement was not reached because one essential term—whether
Mr. Reese would be required to exhaust—was never discussed. R93, R88. LWP has
always maintained that the parties were still in the process of negotiation when LWP's
counsel left the mediation. R93. LWP has always maintained that the parties never
agreed to waive its right to have Mr. Reese exhaust all funds collected prior to resuming
payment of his medical bills because this term was never discussed between LWP and
Mr. Reese. R88.
However, as LWP has argued at length in its introductory brief, it is in error for
the trial court (and this Court) to engage in this type of fact discovery and analysis. The
discussions in mediation are confidential. The rules relating to mediation require that any
agreement reached during mediation be reduced to writing so as to preclude Courts from
requiring evidentiary hearings so as to prove alleged oral agreement allegedly reached
during mediation. The trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that Ms. Acosta
be deposed and its ruling should be reversed and the sanctity of mediations maintained.
E. Ms. Acosta Stayed at the Mediation to Negotiate A Settlement and for No
Other Purpose.
Next, Mr. Reese argues at page 13 of his brief that "Ms. Acosta remained in Craig
Reese's Counsel's office for close to an hour during which she spoke with her client by
phone and explained to LWP that she had already made the offer several times and Craig
Reese had accepted it and relied upon it." First, Mr. Reese's counsel was not privy to
attorney-client privileged communication between Ms. Acosta and LWP and he is only
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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speculating as to what was said between Ms. Acosta and her client. R131. Ms. Acosta
remained at the mediation for her own purposes and Ms. Acosta is not required to reveal
her reasoning which is protected by attorney-client privilege and is attorney workproduct. Mr. Henriksen's speculation and conjecture is not evidence.
If Mr. Henriksen intends to offer his own testimony on this point, then upon
remand he should be disqualified as counsel in this case and LWP should be granted
leave to depose him and conduct further discovery into this matter. LWP recognizes the
unprecedented nature of this request and makes it only to highlight the ludicrous nature of
Mr. Reese's position. If oral agreements allegedly reached during mediation were
enforceable, then proceedings such as the one at bar where attorneys and mediators are
forced to appear as witnesses in violation of their respective oaths and ethical canons
would become commonplace. This Court should adopt the reasoning of the cases from
other jurisdictions cited by LWP in its opening brief and should adopt the reasoning of
the Utah Model Mediation Act (Utah Code § 78-7 lc-101 et seq.) and find that all
agreements reached during mediation must be reduced to writing so as to avoid the
breach of mediation confidentiality.3

At page 17 of his opposition, Mr. Reese asks that this "court. . . affirm the trial court's
order with the specific instruction of allowing Craig Reese to depose Ms. Acosta and
offer evidence to establish the existence of an agreement." Yet again, Mr. Reese ignores
the dangers in this request. He does not ask for direction regarding the scope of such
deposition, whether attorney-client privilege communications must be revealed, whether
LWP can depose the other attorneys in the suit etc. Mr. Reese turns a blind eye to the
obvious difficulty and problems with his request. LWP identifies these deficiencies to
highlight yet again the unreasonableness of a rule, which would allow disputed oral
agreements reached during mediation to be enforced. The bright-line rule that all
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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F. LWP did not Waive its Objections by Agreeing to Let Mr. Reese File his
Motion in the Underlying Case.
At page 33 of his Opposition, Mr. Reese asserts that the parties "stipulated that the
district court could hear and determine the matter to enforce the settlement agreement."
One again, Mr. Reese omits relevant facts which put his statement into context.
Prior to Mr. Reese filing his Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, Mr. Reese
inquired if LWP would object to his filing the motion within the confines ofthe existing
case. LWP, as a professional courtesy and so as to facilitate the more rapid review ofthe
issue, agreed that the motion to enforce could be filed in the same action. However, by
letter, LWP informed Mr. Reese that it was not waiving any objections to the
enforcement proceedings. R93.
Had LWP known that the trial court would order its counsel deposed prior to allowing
it to intervene in the suit and that Mr. Reese himself would oppose a motion to intervene,
LWP would not have extended Mr. Reese this professional courtesy, for Mr. Reese has
demonstrated LWP no reciprocal courtesy. LWP's ^reement that the motion to enforce
could be brought within the confines of the underlying litigation is not a waiver of its
right to object to the motion to enforce nor a waiver of its right to intervene.
G. LWP Discussed The Mediation Only Out of Necessity to Preserve its Rights
and Because it was Forced to do so by Mr. Reese.
Hypocritically, Mr. Reese attacks LWP at page 33 and 34 of his Opposition for
revealing details about "the mediation and agreement." Mr. Reese himself (despite

mediation agreements be reduced to writing is the better reasoned and most workable
rule.
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denying it elsewhere) admits that LWP was involved in the mediation when he makes
this claim. But most importantly, it is unbelievable that Mr. Reese chastised LWP for
disclosing confidential information when it did so only because it was forced to do so by
Mr. Reese.
At the May 22, 2006 hearing, LWP presented the court with an affidavit from
LWP's counsel. R126. LWP made it very clear at the hearing that it only did so at the
trial court's "insistence." R213, 29:7-10. At every turn, LWP has tried to preserve the
confidentiality of the mediation proceeding, but has been forced by Mr. Reese to push the
envelope on the point and reveal more and more information. That Mr. Reese would
criticize LWP for its behavior is quite amazing and is the classic case where a party
creates an error and then complains about it. See State v. Alfatlawi,

P.3d

(Utah

App. 2006), 2006 WL 3742123 (noting that the invited error doctrine prevented a party
from profiting from error which it assisted in creating).
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §
78-31B-8 WHEN IT ORDERED LWP'S COUNSEL BE DEPOSED.

At page 27 of his brief, Mr. Reese argues that "LWP has grossly mis-characterized the
district court" by saying that it ruled "that settlement discussions made during the course
of a mediation were not confidential and could be admitted into evidence." The trial
court's ruling states that "Mediation discussions contain both 'confidential' and 'nonconfidential' discussions." R179. In no uncertain terms the trial court ruled that certain
discussions made during the course of mediation were non-confidential. R179. Also, at
no time prior to the ruling by the trial court has any court in the state of Utah ever held
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that there were confidential and non-confidential components to mediation. The
established rule of law in Utah since this Court's ruling in Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d
1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), has been that all mediations are confidential. Period.
Accordingly, LWP's summary of the trial court's ruling is hardly a "g*oss mischaracterization" of the trial court's holding.
Mr. Reese goes on to argue that the trial court "properly rules that evidence
concerning a separate agreement made between LWP, a non-party to the mediation, and
Craig Reese during and mediation between Craig Reese and Tingey were not confidential
. . . ." See page 27 of Mr. Reese's Opposition. At no time did the trial court ever make
any finding that LWP was not a party or participant to the mediation; that LWP and Mr.
Reese were negotiating outside the confines of mediation; or anything of this sort. It is
Mr. Reese who is mis-characterizing the trial court's ruling, not LWP.
Even though Mr. Reese adamantly (and for the first time on appeal) argues that
LWP was not a participant to the mediation of this dispute, he relies upon Utah Code
Ann. § 78-31b-8(4) (a statute which addresses only mediation) to support his argument.
See Opposition at page 27.

Mr. Reese argues that Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-8(4) allows

parties and the neutral to agree that a mediation can be non-confidential. Mr. Reese
incorrectly limits the statute to parties to the litigation when the plain language provides
that it is the parties to the mediation (of which LWP was a party) must agree.
Here, as a party to the mediation, LWP does not agree to waive confidentiality of
this mediation. According to § 78-31b-8(4), if LWP does not agree to waive
confidentiality then it cannot be waived. Thus, § 78-31b-8(4) support's LWP's argument
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that all mediation discussions are confidential and cannot be revealed to third parties.
Mr. Reese's attempt to alter the meaning of the statute so as to provide him with a basis
for breaching the confidentiality of the mediation discussion is an incorrect reading of the
statute and is not supported by any case law or rules of statutory construction.
What is clear again and again is that Mr. Reese cannot overcome the fact that it is
common knowledge that when a party is asked to participate in a mediation (even if their
role is that of a lien holder) that party gets the benefits and the limitations of the
mediation process. No matter how hard Mr. Reese struggles to exempt himself from
this, he cannot succeed. LWP participated in a mediation. As a participant to a
mediation, it is entitled to the benefits of confidentiality. See Utah Code § 78-31b-8(4).
At page 30 of his opposition, Mr. Reese cites three Utah court cases for the
proposition that Utah Courts often reveal the terms of settlement agreements in published
opinions. The cases relied upon by Mr. Reese are not persuasive and should be
disregarded by the court for none of them involves agreements reached during the
confines of mediation.
At page 35 of his Opposition, Mr. Reese states that "the district court did not even
order Ms. Acosta to be deposed about confidential matters. The trial court determined
that the separate agreement was a different issue than the issue of liability between
Tingey and Craig Reese." Mr. Reese argues that since the trial court only requires Ms

(

Acosta to testify about "non-confidential" portions of the mediation, § 78-3 lb-8 is not
violated.
i
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This argument begs the question of which portions of the mediation would be
considered confidential and which would not be considered confidential. The trial court
has issued a ruling, which if enforced by the Court, would require subsequent litigation of
every mediation that did not result in a written agreement. Suddenly, every time one
participated in a mediation and an agreement was not reached, there would be a chance
that things you said during the course of the mediation could be used against you.
This would have a chilling effect on all mediations. The better approach is the
bright-lined approach of the Utah Uniform Mediation Act, Utah Code § 78-3 lb-8, and
the reasoning of Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), which preserves
confidentiality. Similarly, the courts in Vernon v. Action, 732 N.E.2d 805, 806 (Ind.
2000), In re Acceptance Insurance Company, 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 2000), and
Wilmington Hospital L.L.C. v. New Castle County 788 A.2d 536 (Del. Ch. 2001), each
have found that the most reasonable approach is to require that agreements reached
during mediation be reduced to writing. If an "exception" to the confidentiality rules is
made in circumstances when a party wishes to enforce an oral agreement, it would surely
become an instance where the exception would swallow the rule. See Vernon, 732
N.E.2d at 809 (noting that an exception for oral agreements has the potential to swallow
the rule).
LWP asks this Court to adopt the reasoning of those authorities that hold that any
agreement reached during the course of a mediation must be reduced to writing to be
enforceable. If this Court were to enforce alleged oral agreements then there is a fear

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1£

that the precepts of confidentiality— which are the cornerstone of mediation-would be
unrecognizably eroded.
IV.

MR. REESE'S ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH CASE LAW RELIED
UPON BY LWP FAILS.
Mr. Reese attempts to distinguish the case law LWP relies upon in its appellate

brief, but fails.
A. The Principles in Lyons v. Booker Apply to this Case,
Mr. Reese takes considerable effort to distinguish the court's ruling in Lyons v.
Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Mr. Reeseargues that Lyons is
distinguishable because (1) the court ordered mediation in that case and (2) the rules of
appellate mediation specifically state that mediation is confidential. Mr. Reese's attempt
to distinguish himself from Lyons fails.
LWP acknowledges that Lyons v. Booker dealt specifically with appellate
mediation but doubts that the Court intended its importance to be limited only to
appellate mediation. The pronouncement by the court in Lyons that mediation
discussions were confidential was not specifically limited to appellate mediation and the
language therein is broad enough to encompass all types of mediation.
Also, the parties here voluntarily agreed to mediation this dispute. At the joint
opening session the mediator advised the parties that the rules of mediation applied.
Unfortunately, because Mr. Reese did not raise his claim that LWP was not a participant
in the mediation at the trial court level, LWP was deprived of its right to introduce
evidence on this point. But it is important to note that Mr. Reese has not introduced any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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evidence, which proves that the parties did not intend the rules of confidentiality provided
by statute and court rule to apply to the mediation of the dispute.
B. The Utah Uniform Mediation Act Support's LWP's Claim of
Confidentiality.
Furthermore, this Court need not rely solely upon Lyons to find that the mediation
between LWP and Mr. Reese was confidential. Effective May 1, 2006, the Utah
Legislature adopted the Uniform Mediation Act, Utah Code § 78-3 lc-101 (2006) et seq.
While the mediation between LWP and Mr. Reese occurred prior to the effective date of
the Act, section 78-3 lc-114 of the Act notes that after May 1, 2007, only 4 months away,
the Uniform Mediation Act applies to all mediation agreements, no matter when entered.
Thus, by the mere passage of time, the Act will apply to the mediation between Mr.
Reese and LWP and will provide LWP with the confidentiality to which it is required
without reliance on Lyons.
Also relevant is that § 78-31c-104 plainly states that any "participant" to a
mediation is entitled to confidentiality and that any participant can require that others
who are participants to the mediation maintain such confidentiality as well. See id. ; see
also, Karen Hobbs, Mediation Confidentiality and Enforceable Settlements: Deal or no
Deal? (2006), http://www.hobbsmediation.com/pgl2.cfrru See also Addendum at page
24.
C.

The Cases Relied Upon by Mr. Reese to Argue that Oral Mediation
Agreements Can be Enforced are Distinguishable.

Mr. Reese relies upon the case of Catamount Slat Prod. Inc. v. Sheldon, 845 A.2d
324, 331 (Vt. 2003), for the proposition that parties may rely upon oral contracts even if
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

they intend to memorialize into written document. Opposition at page 37. However, Mr.
Reese fails to state that in Catamount the court also found as follows: "On the other
hand, if either party communicates an intent not to be bound until he achieves a fully
executed document, no amount of negotiation or oral agreement to specific terms will
result in the formation of a binding contract." Id. at 329. In that case, the court found
that the parties did not intend to be bound until the execution of a written document.
The same is true here. Ms. Acosta called LWP to discuss the final terms of the
agreement when she was handed the written Memorandum of Understanding. R126-131.
Her actions alone illustrate that LWP did not intend to be bound until the terms of the
written agreement were reviewed with LWP.
This is the same reasoning set forth in the case of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan
of Northwest v. Doe, 903 P.2d 375 (Or.App. 1995). Mr. Reese cites this case claiming
that the court in Kaiser found that an oral agreement reached during mediation was
enforceable. What Mr. Reese fails to advise this Court is that the plaintiffs' attorney in
that case executed a written document at the conclusion of the mediation which
memorialized the essential terms of the agreement. See id. at 379. The plaintiff only
refused to execute the more-lengthy, subsequent document. See id. The trial court in that
case could litigate the terms of the settlement without delving into the confidentiality of
the mediation because the material terms of the agreement had been reduced to writing.
See id.
The case at bar is distinguishable. Here, prior to leaving the mediation, LWP
refused to execute any written document on the ground that no agreement had been
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reached. R126. LWP advised all involved that the Memorandum of Understanding
included a term to which LWP did not agree. R88, 126. There is no way to determine
whether an oral agreement was reached by the parties without breaching the
confidentiality of the mediation process.
Mr. Reese also relies upon the case of Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802 (W.
Va 2002). That case is also distinguishable. There, post-mediation, the mediator
negotiated a settlement over the phone and reduced it to writing. See id at 804. The
mediator and one of the parties executed the document and forwarded it to the other
parties. See id at 804-05. The second party did not sign the document but drafted its own
document and asked that the others execute his document which included additional
terms. See id at 805. When the parties declined to execute the new document, the
parties brought suit to enforce the settlement agreement. See id.
The facts of Riner are quite different from the facts here. Even though the second
party refused to execute the document proposed to it by the first party, the second party
did execute some form of writing. The court enforced the agreement to the extent the
terms of the two documents matched. See id at 809. Also important is that neither party
raised the issue of confidentiality. See id.
Thus, the cases relied upon by Mr. Reese to support his claim that the trial court
properly ordered LWP to produce its counsel for deposition have facts which are very
different from the case at bar. This Court should follow the cases proposed by LWP as
they are more closely on point.
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V.

LWP's RELIANCE ON CASE LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
IS PROPER AND SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THE COURT.

It should be noted that Mr. Reese fails to distinguish much of the case law
relied upon by LWP in its opening brief and this should be taken as an admission
that LWP's assertion of the holdings and application of such law is accurate.
Mr. Reese has capitulated on these points.
Mr. Reese weakly attempts to distinguish Vernon v. Action, 732 N.E.2d 8005
(Ind. 2000), Wilmington Hospital L.L.C. v. New Castle County 788 A.2d 536 (Del. Ch.
2001), and Ryan v.Garcia 33 Cal.Rpt.2d 158, 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), by reviving his
argument that LWP and Mr. Reese were not "in a mediation" and argues that, as a
consequence, the reasoning in these cases do not apply. As stated before, this argument
was not preserved below. Moreover, it is inaccurate. LWP attended and participated in
the mediation. It is entitled to the benefits and burdens of mediation.
Mr. Reese does not attack LWP's account of Clark v. Stapleton Corp., 957 F.2d
745, 746 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that for federal mediation program to work "participants
must trust that matters discussed at a conference will not be revealed to the judges."); In
re Acceptance Insurance Company 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 2000)(where the
court entertained a writ of mandamus to address the error of allowing parties to testify at
trial regarding confidential mediation discussions). Reno v. Haler, 734 N.E.2d 1095,
1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (Where agreement within confines of mediation was enforced
because the mediator had taken handwritten notes and the parties signed these notes in
lieu of a more formal document, but still requiring some form of writing that "contain the
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terms to which the parties agreed".); Spencer v. Spencer, 72 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (where agreement within confines of mediation was dictated by the mediator at the
end of the mediation but one party thought she would be given the chance to review this
dictation prior to signature was found not enforceable until it had been signed by the
parties); Regents of the University of California v. Sumner, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that oral discussion after mediation had concluded was not
subject to the same confidentiality protections as statements within mediation).
As the court in Ryan, supra, held: "Judicial sifting of statements made at a
confidential mediation to select those which can be used as evidence of an agreement
contravenes the legislative intent underlying adoption [of ADR rules and] . . . undercuts
the effect of the statute intended by the Legislature." 33 Cal. Rpt.2d 158 at 161. Most
importantly, the court in Ryan noted that if oral mediation settlements were enforceable,
it would be "costly and time-consuming." IcL at 162. Allowing for oral mediation
settlement "permits full-blown trials to determine, in each mediation case, if there was an
oral agreement and, if so, on what terms." Id
VI.

CONCLUSION

LWP respectfully requests that the trial court be reversed and that this matter be
remanded to the trial court with direction that Mr. Reese's motion to enforce be
dismissed with prejudice for lack of admissible evidence in support thereof.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, on this l&_ day of January 2007.
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X. ADDENDUM

Mediation Confidentiality and Enforceable Settlements:
Deal or No Deal?
Karin S. Hobbs, Attorney/Mediator

After hours of mediation, the parties have reached a "deal" on the principal issues. The
parties want closure. Attorneys begin preparing the written agreement to ensure the deal
is clear, complete, final and enforceable. Confidential mediation discussions continue.
Emotions run high as the parties work through the final issues. If the "deal" is not written
and signed, is there an agreement? Are the discussions confidential? How do attorneys
ensure confidentiality of mediation? How do attorneys create an enforceable settlement
agreement and avoid court action?
Why is confidentiality so important? Confidentiality is a critical element of successful
mediation. In order for the mediator, the attorneys and the clients to understand the
central issues, the motivations, the pressure points and the risks of litigation, the
participants must be assured the discussions cannot and will not be disclosed to others so
they can talk openly. Frequently, some of the motivating forces behind lawsuits are
legally irrelevant and yet exceptionally important to understanding the conflict and
facilitating resolution. Frequently, clients disclose private events, perceptions or issues in
mediation they would not want disclosed to anyone. Explaining their concerns and fears
is often critically important to them in order to resolve the conflict. If discussions with
the mediator are not confidential and privileged, the mediation process, the mediator's
role and the potential for resolution are significantly diminished.
In preparing for mediation, attorneys explain to clients that mediation is confidential.
"These are settlement discussions and cannot be disclosed in court," attorneys tell their
clients. "You can feel free to talk to the mediator. She won't disclose it to the other side
if you tell her the information is confidential." In the opening session of the mediation
conference, the mediator explains that the discussions are confidential and privileged.
All participants sign an Agreement to Mediate stating they understand the mediation
process, the mediator's role and the confidentiality of the discussions. Mediation
proceeds based on an understanding that the mediation discussions are confidential.
Despite mediation confidentiality, courts are increasingly asked to enforce settlement
agreements reached in mediation jeopardizing confidential mediation discussions.4
4

Simmons v. Ghaderl 143 Cal. App. 4th 410 (Cal App. 2d Dist.) (2006).
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Confidentiality and privilege, two different yet intertwined concepts, are often used
interchangeably. Confidentiality means the mediation communications are not disclosed.
The mediation privilege is a rule providing that the confidential communications are not
admissible in court. Utah recently enacted the Uniform Mediation Act articulating
guidelines for mediation privilege and mediation confidentiality. Attorneys can take
steps to plan for and create enforceable settlement agreements to ensure that the process
remains confidential and privileged.
1. The Uniform Mediation Act
a. Mediation Communications
On May 1, 2006, Utah became the eighth state to adopt the Uniform Mediation Act
(UMA).5 The Uniform Mediation act defines mediation communication as "conduct or a
statement, whether oral, in a record, verbal, or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation
or is made for purposes of considering, conducting, participating in, initiating,
continuing, or reconvening a mediation or retaining a mediator." Utah Code Ann. § 783 lc-102(2) (2006). Thus, discussions with a mediator before, during or as a continuation
of the mediation discussions are both confidential and privileged under the Uniform
Mediation Act. When the mediator meets with the attorney and client before mediation
or in a follow-up meeting, the protections of confidentiality and privilege continue to
apply.
b. Mediation Confidentiality
i.

Prior to the Uniform Mediation Act

Even prior to the creation of the Uniform Mediation Act, courts throughout the country
recognized mediation confidentiality as essential to effective mediation because it allows
a candid and informal exchange of information.6 "The process works best when parties
speak with complete candor, acknowledge weaknesses, and seek common ground,
without fear that, if a settlement is not achieved, their words will later be used against

5

Utah joins Washington D.C., Iowa, Nebraska, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and
Washington. Vermont was the ninth state to adopt the UMA, and the UMA is pending in
four states: New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Minnesota.
6
Foxgate Homeowners Association v. Bramalea California, Inc., 26 Cal.4thl,14 (Cal.
2001); Sharp, D., Mediation Confidentiality, AAA Handbook on Mediation (2006).
Hoffman, D. and Shemin V., The Uniform Mediation Act: Upgrading Confidentiality in
Mediation, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, July 18, 2005.
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them in the more traditionally adversarial litigation process." Courts agree that "[w]hat
is said and done during the mediation process will remain confidential, unless there is an
express waiver by all parties or unless the need for disclosure is so great that it
substantially outweighs the need for confidentiality."8 Further, "[t]he mediation process
was not designed to create another layer of litigation in an already over-burdened
system."9
ii. Confidentiality under the Uniform Mediation Act
The Uniform Mediation Act, finalized in 2003, solidifies and reinforces mediation
confidentiality. Mediation confidentiality, according to the drafters of the Uniform
Mediation Act, encourages parties to have an informal and candid exchange of ideas.10
Frank discussions are essential to opening constructive and creative dialogue and to
enabling parties to discover ways to resolve their disputes independent of the judicial
system. x According to the Act, "[t]his frank exchange can be achieved only if the
participants know that what is said in the mediation will not be used to their detriment
through later court proceedings and adjudicatory processes."12
The Utah Uniform Mediation Act specifies that mediation communications are
"confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of this
state" unless subject to the open and public meetings statutes or government access to
records laws. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-108 (2006). Thus, the act provides for a general
protective umbrella of confidentiality over mediation communications.
iii. Confidentiality Rules and Statutes in Utah
Utah's Alternative Dispute Resolution Act also provides that "[u]nless all parties and the
neutral agree, no person attending an ADR proceeding . . . may disclose or be required to
disclose any information obtained in the court of an ADR proceeding, including any
memoranda, notes, records, or work product." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-8(4). Further,
"an ADR provider . . . may not disclose or be required to disclose any information about
any ADR proceeding to anyone outside the proceeding . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb8(5).

7

Princeton Ins. Co. v Court of Chancery of Delaware, 883 A.2d 44, 51 (Del. 2005); see
also, Foxgate Homeowners Association v. Bramalea California, Inc. 26 Cal.4thl,14 (Cal.
2001).
8
Lehr v. Afflitto, 382 N.J. Super. 376, 391, 889 A.2d 462, 472 (N.J. 2006).
9
Id.
10
Uniform Mediation Act, Final Version with prefatory remarks, National Conference on
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (2003).
11
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Further, the Utah Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution provides "[mjotions,
memoranda, exhibits, affidavits, and other written, oral or other communication
submitted . . . to the ADR provider .. . shall be confidential and shall not be made a part
of the record or filed with the clerk of the court. Neither shall any such communication
be transmitted to the judge to whom the case is assigned . . . ,"13 The ADR provider
"shall not disclose to or discuss with anyone, including the assigned judge, any
information about or related to the proceedings, unless specifically provided otherwise in
these rules. ADR providers shall secure and ensure the confidentiality of ADR
proceeding records."14
Rule 4-510 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration also states that "No ADR
provider may be required to testify as to any aspect of an ADR proceeding except as to
any claim of violation of URCADR Rule 104 which raises a substantial question as to the
impartiality of the ADR provider and the conduct of the ADR proceeding involved."
Thus, the Utah Uniform Mediation Act, Utah's Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, the
Utah Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration all provide that mediation discussions are not to be disclosed to others. In
one narrowly drawn Utah appellate case, the Utah Court of Appeals enforced the
confidentiality of court-ordered appellate mediation stating that counsel, the parties, and
the mediator could not disclose any statements, comments, or notes made during the
initial mediation conference or in related discussions.15
Mediation confidentiality is more expansive than confidentiality in other professional
relationships. In many professional relationships, the duty of confidentiality, such as the
attorney/client relationship and the physician/patient relationship, the obligation restricts
the professional only and not the client or patient.16 For example, in the attorney/client
relationship, the client is free to disclose conversations with the attorney, whereas the
attorney is prohibited from doing so.17 However, mediation is different. In mediation, the
duty to maintain confidentiality extends to all participants from all participants,
including third-parties, "to the extent agreed to by the parties or provided by other law or
rule of this state." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31c-108 (2006). The Utah Uniform Mediation
Act specifically allows third party involvement in mediation and allows third-parties the
protection of mediation confidentiality and the mediation privilege.
c. Mediation Privilege

14
15

Rule 103, Utah Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution

w.

Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1999).
Utah R. Evid 506(c); DeBrv v. Goates, 999 P.2d 582 (Utah 2000).
17
Rule 1.12 Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
16
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So, how does the mediation privilege mesh with mediation confidentiality? Confidential
mediation communications, under Utah evidentiary law, are settlement discussions under
1 O

the federal and state rules of evidence and are not disclosed in court. The Uniform
Mediation Act specifically provides for a mediation privilege and articulates waivers of
the privilege and exceptions to the privilege. For example, in the medical profession,
patient records are confidential; however the physician/patient privilege regulates
whether the information can be admitted as evidence in court. Similarly, mediation
communications are confidential, and the privilege governs admission of the confidential
information in court.
d. Waiver of the Privilege
How can the privilege be waived, thus allowing the mediation communications to be
admitted as evidence in a proceeding? The Uniform Mediation Act provides that the
mediation privilege may be waived in a record or orally during a proceeding if it is
expressly waived by all parties to the mediation and is expressly waived by the mediator
and by the third party participants. Thus, in order to waive the privilege, everyone
involved in the mediation must waive the privilege in a record or in a proceeding.
The Act further states that a person may be precluded from asserting the privilege if a
person discloses or makes a representation about a mediation that prejudices another
person in a proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-105(2) (2006). Thus, attorneys,
clients, mediators and third-party participants in mediation should be forewarned that
they may waive the privilege if they make a statement about mediation communications.
For example, if a client takes confidential mediation discussions to the media and the
disclosure prejudices the other side, the privilege may be waived. If the privilege is
waived, it is only waived to the extent necessary for the person to respond to the
representation or disclosure.
All mediation participants should be on notice that disclosure of confidential information
may leave a crack open in a door they wanted sealed shut. For example, if a mediation
participant learns confidential information during mediation, disclosure of that
information may give rise to a lawsuit for breach of contract, i.e., the mediation
agreement. If damages are proven, a plaintiff may prevail on the breach of a
confidentiality provision in a mediation agreement. All mediation participants should
understand that breaching the Agreement to Mediate and mediation confidentiality can
lead to future problems and potential lawsuits.
e. Exceptions to the Privilege

Utah R. Evid. 408; Fed. R. Evid. 408.
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The Act also provides exceptions to the mediation privilege. Prior to the Uniform
Mediation Act, case law developed exceptions to the mediation privilege. In 1999,
Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil jolted the mediation community when he ordered a
mediator to testify.19 In Olam, a woman participated in mediation late into the night and
signed an agreement. She then moved to set aside the agreement, claiming that she was
physically, intellectually and emotionally incapable of giving consent. The court held that
the best evidence of her capacity to consent was testimony from the mediator. After both
parties waived their right to maintain the confidentiality of the mediation
communications, but the mediator did not waive confidentiality, Judge Brazil ordered the
mediator to testify in a sealed proceeding. Judge Brazil reasoned that the public interest
in disclosing the confidential mediation discussions outweighed the interest in
confidentiality. Although this case has been distinguished due to the parties' waiver of
confidentiality, the case created great concern among the mediation community and is
often cited for the proposition that the interest in confidentiality may be weighed against
the public interest in disclosing the confidential information.20
Mediation confidentiality has also been deemed waived when an attorney failed to object
11

to admission of or evidence of events occurring in mediation. In addition, a juvenile's
significant constitutional right to a defense has been held to outweigh mediation
confidentiality.
Prior to May 1, 2006, attorneys relied on the evidentiary rule that evidence of conduct or
statements made in compromise negotiations is not admissible. The Utah Uniform
Mediation Act creates a specific mediation privilege and extends it to the parties, the
mediator and third-party participants. The mediation communication is not privileged if
the mediation communication is demonstrated "in an agreement evidenced by a record
signed by all parties to the agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-106(l) (2006). Thus,
if all parties sign an agreement, that agreement is not privileged. In addition, there is no
privilege if the mediation communication is available to the public under the public
meeting laws or if a threat is made to inflict bodily injury or to commit a crime of
violence. Also, the Act states there is no mediation privilege if the mediation
communication is used to plan a crime or if it is sought or offered to prove or disprove a
iy

Olam v. Congress Mortgage Company, 68 F.Supp.2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
Eisendrath v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App.4th 351 (2003) (participants to mediation
cannot impliedly waive their confidentiality rights by challenging the agreement reached
in mediation.)
21
Regents of University of California v. Sumner 42 Cal. App.4th1209 (1996).
22
Rinaker v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.4th 155 (Cal. 1998) (Prior inconsistent
statements made by a witness at mediation may be introduced at a subsequent
delinquency hearing.).
23
Utah R. Evid. 408. The Utah rule is identical to Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
20
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claim or complaint of professional malpractice. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-106(1 )(b) (e) (2006).
Finally, the Utah Uniform Mediation Act states that mediation communications are not
privileged if "there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in
protecting confidentiality." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-l'06(2)(b) (2006). To qualify
under this provision, the mediation communications must not otherwise be available and
the communication must be sought or offered either in a felony or misdemeanor
proceeding or in a proceeding regarding a contract arising out of mediation. Thus, if
one of the parties seeks to enforce a mediation agreement, the court may find no
mediation privilege if a more important countervailing public interest is involved, the
evidence it not otherwise available and the communication is sought in an action to
enforce a mediated agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-106(2) (2006)
2. Practical Steps to Maintain Confidentiality and Avoid Court Action
a. Prepare Settlement Agreement in Advance of Mediation
Mediation has expanded enormously. As a result, actions to enforce mediated
agreements are becoming more common. Although the Uniform Mediation Act and other
rules offer a veil of confidentiality, what practical steps can attorneys take to avoid court
action and preserve confidentiality?
Prior to the mediation conference, attorneys should envision standard provisions of a
settlement agreement. Attorneys can either arrive at the mediation conference with a
laptop computer, a partially drafted settlement agreement or prepared staff members
standing by to compose and/or email documents to the mediation. Clients are also
excellent sources of this preparation, as they often identify unknown and important terms.

b. Create and sign a written agreement in mediation
At the close of the mediation conference, attorneys and clients should create and sign a
written agreement addressing all essential terms, if possible. Additional time spent in
mediation drafting and signing the settlement agreement, while everyone is focused on
settling the case, will significantly reduce the most common reason to explore
confidential mediation communications. How can you accomplish this effectively at the
end of a long day when the participants are exhausted? What if a party voices a desire to
prepare the agreement the following day or a desire to "sleep on it." At this point, the
clients and attorneys are required to think about the benefits of closure versus the risk the
agreement may fall apart. Both options are available. If a signed agreement is not
possible due to lack of information, insufficient time or complexity of the issues, the
parties may want to continue the process. If enough of the information is available,
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continuing the process is generally not helpful. However, some cases require more than
one or two mediation sessions. In addition, attorneys should clarify for clients the impact
of leaving the mediation without signing an agreement, the loss of momentum, and
whether either party will be held to any statements made during the mediation process.
Momentum is another consideration. At the end of the negotiation, parties have
momentum and are more likely to concede on minor issues.
c. Desire for Finality vs. Reluctance to Enter an Agreement
Finalizing the agreement in writing is the final stage of the mediation process.
Momentum is often lost if the parties leave mediation without an agreement. Frequently,
if an agreement is not signed on the day of mediation, one party retracts the agreement.
Attorneys and clients can prepare for this tension of reluctance to enter an agreement
versus desire for finality by understanding this tension exists and knowing this tension is
a common final step in resolving conflict. Mediators and attorneys can facilitate closure.
As the agreement is prepared, food can be delivered, rejuvenating the participants.
Clients can take a walk around the block, check their email or run an errand. Just the
brief break assists the parties in clearing their minds and preparing to sign the final
agreement.
d. Standard Provisions in Settlement Agreements
Standard provisions in settlement agreements include releases of liability, resolution of
all claims and defenses, dismissal of lawsuits, timelines and security for payments,
confidentiality clauses, cooperation in preparing documents necessary to effectuate the
agreement, and payment of attorney fees. The parties may want their agreement to state
that in the event of a dispute regarding the agreement, they will return to mediation prior
to initiating court action. As with all other provisions of the agreement, this provision
could be negotiated, including the process to be used, the allocation of costs and other
terms that serves the parties interest in resolving the dispute and avoiding the litigation
process. To avoid claims of duress, agreements should also state that the parties enter the
agreement freely, voluntarily, without duress or coercion and with the advice of counsel.

i
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Standard Settlement Agreement
Provisions:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•

Mutual releases of liability
Dismissal of lawsuit(s)
Timelines for payments, interest,
security, liens
Confidentiality clauses
Cooperation in preparing
documents necessary to effectuate
agreement
Payment of attorney fees
Resolution of all claims and
defenses
Dispute resolution clauses, i.e.,
mediation, arbitration, allocation
of costs
Agreement entered freely,
voluntarily, without duress or
coercion and with the advice of
counsel

e. Achieving Closure
The goal of the mediation process is to empower parties with information and a process
for solving their own issues by mutual agreement without court intervention. If the
process produces another layer of litigation, the mediation process will suffer and parties
will hesitate to engage in frank and productive settlement discussions. After the
agreement is signed, the clients generally feel relief. They have compromised more than
they wanted but are relieved the conflict is resolved. Carefully crafted settlement
agreements insulate the parties from court action, and allow parties to resolve the
conflict, move on and focus their emotions and energy on other more positive aspects of
their lives.
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UTAH UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT
78-31c-101. Title,
This chapter is known as the "Utah Uniform Mediation Act."
78-31c-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Mediation" means a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and
negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding
their dispute.
(2) "Mediation communication" means conduct or a statement, whether oral, in a
record, verbal, or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of
considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a
mediation or retaining a mediator.
(3) "Mediation party" means a person that participates in a mediation and whose
agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute.
(4) "Mediator" means an individual who is neutral and conducts a mediation.
(5) "Nonparty participant" means a person, other than a party or mediator, that
participates in a mediation.
(6) "Person" means an individual, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, partnership,
limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or
commercial entity.
(7) "Proceeding" means:
(a) a judicial, administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative process, including related
prehearing and posthearing motions, conferences, and discovery; or
(b) a legislative hearing or similar process.
(8) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(9) "Sign" means:
(a) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol with the present intent to authenticate a
record; or
(b) to attach or logically associate an electronic symbol, sound, or process to or with a
record with the present intent to authenticate a record.
78-31c-103. Scope.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2) or (3), this chapter applies to a
mediation in which:
(a) the mediation parties are required to mediate by statute, court, or administrative
agency rule or referred to mediation by a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator;
(b) the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a record that
demonstrates an expectation that mediation communications will be privileged against
disclosure; or
(c) the mediation parties use as a mediator an individual who holds himself or herself
out as a mediator or the mediation is provided by an entity that holds itself out as
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providing mediation.
(2) The chapter does not apply to a mediation:
(a) relating to the establishment, negotiation, administration, or termination of a
collective bargaining relationship;
(b) relating to a dispute that is pending under or is part of the processes established by
a collective bargaining agreement, except that the chapter applies to a mediation arising
out of a dispute that has been filed with an administrative agency or court;
(c) conducted by a judge who might make a ruling on the case; or
(d) conducted under the auspices of:
(i) a primary or secondary school if all the parties are students; or
(ii) a correctional institution for youths if all the parties are residents of that institution.
(3) If the parties agree in advance in a signed record, or a record of proceeding reflects
agreement by the parties, that all or part of a mediation is not privileged, the privileges
under Sections 78-31c-104 through 78-31c-106 do not apply to the mediation or part
agreed upon. However, Sections 78-31c-104 through 78-31c-106 apply to a mediation
communication made by a person that has not received actual notice of the agreement
before the communication is made.
78-31c-104. Privilege against disclosure — Admissibility — Discovery.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-31c-106, a mediation communication
is privileged as provided in Subsection (2) and is not subject to discovery or admissible in
evidence in a proceeding unless waived or precluded as provided by Section 78-31c-105.
(2) In a proceeding, the following privileges apply:
(a) A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from
disclosing, a mediation communication.
(b) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and may prevent
any other person from disclosing a mediation communication of the mediator.
(c) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person
from disclosing, a mediation communication of the nonparty participant.
(3) Evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does
not become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by reason of its disclosure or
use in a mediation.
78-31c-105. Waiver and preclusion of privilege.
(1) A privilege under Section 78-31c-104 may be waived in a record or orally during a
proceeding if it is expressly waived by all parties to the mediation, and:
(a) in the case of the privilege of a mediator, it is expressly waived by the mediator;
and
(b) in the case of the privilege of a nonparty participant, it is expressly waived by the
nonparty participant.
(2) A person that discloses or makes a representation about a mediation
communication which prejudices another person in a proceeding is precluded from
asserting a privilege under Section 78-31c-104, but only to the extent necessary for the
person prejudiced to respond to the representation or disclosure.
(3) A person that intentionally uses a mediation to plan, attempt to commit or commit
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a crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity is precluded from
asserting a privilege under Section 78-31c-104.
78-31c-106. Exceptions to privilege.
(1) There is no privilege under Section 78-31c-104 for a mediation communication
that is:
(a) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement;
(b) available to the public under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and
Management Act, or made during a mediation session which is open, or is required by
law to be open, to the public;
(c) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of
violence;
(d) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit or commit a crime, or to
conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity;
(e) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional
misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator;
(f) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), sought or offered to prove or
disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a
mediation party, nonparty participant, or representative of a party based on conduct
occurring during a mediation; or
(g) subject to the reporting requirements in Section 62A-3-305 or 62A-4a-403.
(2) There is no privilege under Section 78-31c-104 if a court, administrative agency,
or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the
proponent of the evidence has shown that:
(a) the evidence is not otherwise available;
(b) there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in
protecting confidentiality; and
(c) the mediation communication is sought or offered in:
(i) a court proceeding involving a felony or misdemeanor; or
(ii) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), a proceeding to prove a claim to
rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.
(3) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation
communication referred to in Subsection (l)(f) or (2)(c)(ii).
(4) If a mediation communication is not privileged under Subsection (1) or (2), only
the portion of the communication necessary for the application of the exception from
nondisclosure may be admitted. Admission of evidence under Subsection (1) or (2) does
not render the evidence, or any other mediation communication, discoverable or
admissible for any other purpose.
78-31c-107. Prohibited mediator reports.
(1) Except as required in Subsection (2), a mediator may not make a report,
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a
mediation to a court, administrative agency, or other authority that may make a ruling on
the dispute that is the subject of the mediation.
(2) A mediator may disclose:
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(a) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was
reached, and attendance;
(b) a mediation communication as permitted under Section 78-31c-106; or
(c) a mediation communication evidencing abuse, neglect, abandonment, or
exploitation of an individual to a public agency responsible for protecting individuals
against such mistreatment.
(3) A communication made in violation of Subsection (1) may not be considered by a
court, administrative agency, or arbitrator.
78-31c-108. Confidentiality,
Unless subject to Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act, and Title 63,
Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act, mediation
communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other
law or rule of this state.
78-31c-109. Mediator's disclosure of conflicts of interest — Background.
(1) Before accepting a mediation, an individual who is requested to serve as a
mediator shall:
(a) make an inquiry that is reasonable under the circumstances to determine whether
there are any known facts that a reasonable individual would consider likely to affect the
impartiality of the mediator, including a financial or personal interest in the outcome of
the mediation and an existing or past relationship with a mediation party or foreseeable
participant in the mediation; and
(b) disclose any known fact to the mediation parties as soon as practical before
accepting a mediation.
(2) If a mediator learns any fact described in Subsection (l)(a) after accepting a
mediation, the mediator shall disclose it as soon as practicable.
(3) At the request of a mediation party, an individual who is requested to serve as a
mediator shall disclose the mediator's qualifications to mediate a dispute.
(4) Subsections (1), (2), (3), and (6) do not apply to an individual acting as a judge or
ombudsman.
(5) This chapter does not require that a mediator have a special qualification by
background or profession.
(6) A mediator must be impartial, unless after disclosure of the facts required in
Subsections (1) and (2) to be disclosed, the parties agree otherwise.
78-31c-110. Participation in mediation.
An attorney or other individual designated by a party may accompany the party to, and
participate in, a mediation. A waiver of participation given before the mediation may be
rescinded.
78-31c-lll. International commercial mediation.
(1) In this section:
(a) "International commercial mediation" means an international commercial
conciliation as defined in Article 1 of the Model Law.
(b) "Model Law" means the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation
adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 28 June 2002
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and recommended by the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution
(A/RES/57/18) dated 19 November 2002.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (3) and (4), if a mediation is an
international commercial mediation, the mediation is governed by the Model Law.
(3) Unless the parties agree in accordance with Subsection 78-31c-103(3) that all or
part of an international commercial mediation is not privileged, Sections 78-31c-104
through 78-31c-106 and any applicable definitions in Section 78-31c-102 of this chapter
apply to the mediation and nothing in Article 10 of the Model Law derogates from
Sections 78-31c-104 through 78-31c-106.
(4) If the parties to an international commercial mediation agree under Article 1,
Section (7), of the Model Law that the Model Law does not apply, this chapter applies.
78-31c-112. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act
This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit,
or supersede Section 101(c) of that act or authorize electronic delivery of any of the
notices described in Section 103(b) of that act.
78-31c-113. Uniformity of application and construction.
In applying and construing this chapter, consideration should be given to the need to
promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
78-31c-114. Application to existing agreements or referrals.
(1) This chapter governs a mediation pursuant to a referral or an agreement to mediate
made on or after May 1, 2006.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), on or after May 1, 2007, this chapter governs all
agreements to mediate whenever made.
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